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Robert W. Gordon"
Abstract. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., a former general counsel of General Electric, has written
a book (The Inside Counsel Revolution) proposing an ambitious role for legal advisors to
corporations, which he calls "resolving the partner-guardian tension." Corporate lawyers,
Heineman argues, must be effective agents in helping their clients attain their
performance goals. But they must also ensure that the company acts with "integrity,"
meaning compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the laws of the jurisdictions in
which the company does business, fostering constructive relations with stakeholders as
well as maximizing share prices, and forming collaborations with other companies to
promote public policies that mitigate the harmful externalities of corporate conduct. This
Essay points out that this program looks like a revival of the "managerialist" agenda of
progressive corporate statesmen of the 1920s and 1930s and of relatively progressive
business associations of the 1950s and 1960s, like the Committee for Economic
Development. In recent decades, the managerialist ideal of corporate statesmanship has
been abandoned in favor of the view that the only social responsibility of businesses is to
maximize their profits and that the only responsibility of their lawyers is to help them
overcome regulatory and tax restraints that stand in their way. This Essay argues that this
dominant vision of corporations as amoral profit-seekers and of their lawyers as their
amoral facilitators has proved dangerously misguided, and it welcomes the revival of the
lawyer-statesman ideals of Heineman and his collaborators as a corrective. It also raises
some questions about the feasibility of the ideal.
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal
History, Emeritus, Yale University. I am grateful to Deborah Rhode and Bill Simon for
comments on a previous draft of this Essay. An early version of this Essay was given as a
lecture at Queen Mary University of London, where I received helpful comments from
Paul Berman, Maksymilian Del Mar, and Michael Lobban.
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Introduction
In the spring of 2015, David Wilkins, professor at Harvard Law School,
and Ben Heineman, Jr., former general counsel at General Electric (GE) and
now a lecturer at Harvard, organized a conference of corporate in-house
lawyers and law firm partners.' The conference took as its theme a manifesto-
whose principal authors were Wilkins; Heineman; and William Lee, a former
managing partner at WilmerHale-proposing a role for in-house counsel based
on a capacious concept of the client company's enlightened self-interest and
obligations of citizenship.2 Heineman has since expanded on this set of ideas in
a book: The Inside Counsel Revolution- Resolving the Partner-Guardian Tension.3
This book is partly an account of his tenure at GE, partly a manual for
corporate in-house counsel, and mostly an elaboration of the theme of the
Harvard Manifesto that it is the company lawyer's job to balance the client
company's interest in "performance"-long-term financial prosperity-and
"integrity."4 "Integrity" turns out to be shorthand for a collection of traits and
actions: responsible mitigation of risks of harmful effects of the client's
business; honest dealing and avoidance of corruption; and support for public
policies that regulate harmful externalities and supply public goods-such as
infrastructure, education, and health.5 This project seems of a piece with
parallel-gradual and fragile-movements, which one can see in the policies of
some nation-states and in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund,
away from the hardline neoliberal (or market fundamentalist) doctrine that
unfettered business enterprise under minimal state supervision is the only
feasible route to global well-being.6
1. See Professionalism Project, HARv. L. SCH. CTR. ON LEGAL PROF., https://
clp.law.harvard.edu/clp-research/legal-practice/professionalism-project (last visited
June 6, 2017); see also Gabe Friedman, In Cambridge, Lawyers Debate Future of Their
Profession, BLOOMBERG: BIG L. Bus. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://bol.bna.com/in-cambridge
-lawyers-debate-future-of-their-profession.
2. See generally BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. ET AL., LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS:
KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2014), https://clp.law.harvard
.edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-Essay_11.20.14.pdf.
3. BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-
GUARDIAN TENSION (2016).
4. See generally id.
5. See infra text accompanying note 9.
6. For a discussion of the core doctrines of neoliberalism, see, for example, David Singh
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 1-3. For a discussion of the gradual retreat from market
fundamentalism, see, for example, COLIN CROUCH, MAKING CAPITALISM FIT FOR
SOCIETY 8-19 (2013), among many other works noting this trend.
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The Harvard Manifesto and Heineman's book go well beyond the kind of
high-minded corporate rhetoric generally deployed for ceremonial occasions.
There is a lot of high-minded rhetoric in both, but it is accompanied by many
concrete and specific examples and proposals. I want to focus on the pieces of
both works that deal with lawyers, law firms, and their corporate clients as
citizens with public responsibilities. For me, the most interesting aspect of this
initiative is that it returns to some earlier notions of the responsibilities of legal
professionals as citizens while also trying to update those traditions to take
account of present opportunities and obstacles.
I devote most of this Essay to Heineman's book because it contains the
more extensive version of his views. But let me first quote from the more
compressed and succinct Harvard Manifesto to give the flavor of the general
argument. The authors begin with the assertion that "the ultimate goal of
corporations-especially global companies-should be the fusion of high
performance with high integrity, with the general counsel and inside lawyers
playing key roles in achieving both."7 "High performance" is simply
conventional profit-seeking for the benefit of "shareholders and other
stakeholders upon whom the company's health depends."8 "High integrity" is a
considerably more complicated and multiform concept, which includes
robust adherence to the letter and spirit of formal rules, both legal and financial;
voluntary adoption of binding global ethical standards that go beyond existing
rules, including balanced proposals on future public policy; and employee
commitment to core values of honesty, candor, fairness, trustworthiness, and
reliability. It involves understanding, and mitigating, other types of risk-beyond
direct economic risk-that can cause a company catastrophic harm: legal, ethical,
reputational, communications, public policy, and country-geopolitical. 9
Achieving these goals casts special obligations on the corporation's
lawyers, who have not been discharging them well in recent years:
For lawyers, these integrity issues go far beyond the strictures of mandatory legal
professionalism.
... Ultimately, high performance with high integrity creates fundamental
trust among shareholders, creditors, employees, recruits, customers, suppliers,
regulators, communities, the media, and the general public. This trust is essential
to sustaining the corporate power and freedom that drives the economy-trust
which in the past 10 years has dramatically eroded due to stark corporate scandals
and unthinkable business failures.10
The corporation's outside lawyers share this elevated mission:
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But it is not just the individual attorneys employed by law firms who must
rededicate themselves to their duties as lawyer-citizens. As with the corporations
that comprise the bulk of large law firms' clients, law firms can and should
redouble their efforts in the area of "law firm citizenship," with the goal of
advancing pertinent social goods. This might include public policy efforts in areas
that directly affect law firms' business and professional interests (e.g., tax reform
or legislation aimed at litigation and professional conduct), as well as public
policy efforts in areas that affect the business interests of a given law firm's core
client base-so long as in each case the firm is careflul to advocate for policies that
further the broad public interest and not just the firm's or its client's parochial ones.1I
In addition to such "public policy efforts," the authors recommend that law
firms
adopt a focused philanthropy model, concentrating resources and time on a
specific group of organizations, with an eye toward long-term relationship and
capacity building. This includes financial support, pro bono legal representation,
volunteer service, and in-kind donations. A firm could commit to a financial
contribution over time to each selected organization, but also promise and
commit the time and energy of lawyers and staff to the organization. This long-
term commitment of money and manpower not only benefits the selected
organizations but also allows the firm to act as an institutional citizen in a
different and meaningful way.
Firms also can and should embrace a role in addressing broader societal is-
sues, for example education, scientific research and development, or cybersecurity
and privacy. Firms must recognize and reward those engaged in these efforts both
in compensation and with other recognition. 12
Now, this ambitious program may not, in the end, result in much of
substance. But it does seem to represent an important rhetorical shift away
from conceptions of the business firm and of the obligations of the lawyers
serving the firm that came to prevail around 1980.
In these conceptions it is inappropriate for business firms to serve any
interest but that of maximizing profits for shareholders and inappropriate for
their lawyers to do anything but help them do so.13 It is, in any case,
impractical, as such a firm would become a takeover target or have to replace
its managers.14 It is equally improper under these conceptions for lawyers to
question client managers' chosen ends. That is also impractical. In-house
lawyers will be bypassed or replaced for giving unwelcome advice, and outside
law firms will fear losing business-or a star partner who recruited that
client-to another firm. Similarly, in some conceptions of ethical lawyering, it
11. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. See infra Part III.
14. For the classic version of this argument, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110, 112-13 (1965).
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is not only permissible but also necessary for a lawyer to adopt as her client's
"interests" whatever the corporate agent who is consulting the lawyer presents
as what the actual client immediately wants.1 5 At its worst, as I spell out in
more detail below, this doctrine not only rationalizes passive acceptance of
some pretty dodgy business practices but also actively promotes them.
The Harvard Manifesto and Heineman's book assume that lawyers can and
should have some influence in helping determine business clients' enlightened
long-term interests and goals, which necessarily presupposes that business
firms will have some leeway to act on that advice. In this respect, are the
manifestos more realistic than the doctrine that business firms must follow the
commands of the market or go under, and lawyers the commands of the client?
Yes, in a way. But they are also potentially more radical, even utopian, in a
good way. They represent a throwback to the "managerialist" conception of the
business firm that emerged in the early twentieth century and dominated both
business- and legal-professional ideology in the postwar period of 1945 to about
1975.16
I. "Managerialist" Views of Corporate Citizenship
This managerialist ideology has its origins early in the twentieth century,
when some prominent lawyers and business managers developed a
complementary vision of their roles as leaders in business organizations.
Managers would seek, and encourage their lawyers to give advice that would
help them seek, to realize public values in the course of profit-seeking-or to
put this another way, to be responsible corporate citizens, aware of potential
conflicts their operations might provoke and harmful effects that might ensue,
and to constructively collaborate to mitigate those conflicts and effects.
Louis Brandeis was one of the principal theorists-and most effective
practitioners-of this role. His famous 1905 speech titled "The Opportunity in
the Law" is now remembered chiefly as a summons to public interest
lawyering, a call to leading lawyers to act for "the people" as well as for
corporate clients.' 7 It also urges upon lawyers a public interest-seeking role,
independent of their functions as representatives of any client interests, as
15. See generally William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer
Represent An Anatomy of Intraclient Conduct, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2003) (noting, and
criticizing, the tendency of corporate law doctrine to identify as the "client" whichever
corporate officer is consulting the lawyer).
16. See infra Part I.
17. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical
Society (May 4, 1905) [hereinafter Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law], in Louis D.
BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 313, 321 (1914) [hereinafter BRANDEIS, BuSINEss-A
PROFESSION].
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policy statesmen and drafters of and advocates for sound legislation.18 But its
main purpose is to urge lawyers, in their capacity as advisors to businesses, to
counsel managers to adopt business strategies that will increase the material
welfare and practical capacity for democratic citizenship of their major
constituencies-workers, local communities, and governments.1 9 As is well
known, Brandeis practiced what he preached when he could. For example, he
advised the shoe manufacturer William McElwain to help cure the evil of
irregular employment while also making his plant more efficient by evening
out production over the year. And he advised the Filene brothers, department
store magnates, to quiet labor unrest by giving their workforce a larger
participatory stake in managing the business.20
Brandeis was well aware that because lawyers act for clients, they can only
perform this role if their clients desire and authorize it. So his other great cause
was to make business management a "profession."2 1 A professional, Brandeis
said, rejects the notion that the amount of money made is a fair measure of
success. A business must, of course, be profitable or go under.
But while loss spells failure, large profits do not connote success.... [I]n business,
excellence of performance manifests itself... in the improvement of products; in
more perfect organization, eliminating friction as well as waste; in bettering the
condition of the workingmen, developing their faculties and promoting their
happiness; and in the establishment of right relations with customers and with
the community. 22
The implication was that if managers practiced business as a profession, more
clients like McElwain and the Filenes would show up to demand socially
responsible legal advice.
The cause of professionalizing business was not, of course, confined to
Brandeis. It was taken up by the newly founded Harvard Business School.
Owen D. Young-one of Heineman's predecessors as general counsel of GE and
the company's then-chairman of the board 23-gave the Dedication Address for
the new school in 1927.24 Young argued that as business organizations
18. Id. at 319.
19. Id. at 319-21.
20. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 63-65, 237-40 (2009).
21. Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law, supra note 17, at 313-14.
22. Louis D. Brandeis, Business-A Profession, Address at Brown University
Commencement Day (June 19, 1912), in BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION, supra
note 17, at 1, 4.
23. Owen D. Young, GEN. ELECTRIC, https://www.ge.com/about-us/leadership/profiles/
owen-d-young (last visited June 6, 2017).
24. Owen D. Young, Dedication Address (June 4, 1927), in 5 HARV. Bus. REV. 385 (1927); see
also JOSEPHINE YOUNG CASE & EVERETT NEEDHAM CASE, OWEN D. YOUNG AND
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: A BIOGRAPHY 372-76 (1982).
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expanded and their products and operations grew more technical and
specialized, corporations were no longer subject to local social sanctions,
becoming laws unto themselves.25 In response, legislatures staffed with
"amateurs" passed laws that expressed public outrage at corporate excesses but
were clumsily and ineffectively drafted.26 To avoid ill-judged regulation,
business managers needed to seek remedial measures that would help solve the
problems-or "externalities," as we now call them-their organizations had
helped create. The most important of these problems was the condition of
labor. Workingmen were squeezed to extract the last dollar of profit; their
family lives were destroyed by excessive hours of labor; their entire
communities' welfare was disrupted when plants closed. As Young argued,
"[n]o man with an inadequate wage is free. He is unable to meet his obligations
to his family, to society, and to himself."27 Also, he cannot be a full human
being so long as he is thought of as a hired man. Young hoped for a day when
labor would hire capital, businesses would become democratic rather than
autocratic, and labor and management would cooperate to yield the highest
joint profit and divide it fairly.28 Notably, this statement was made by the
chairman of one of the largest corporations in the world 29 in the conservative
1920s.
Young's words were certainly not empty rhetoric. He came by his ethic
from experience. He was GE's in-house counsel when the company faced a
wave of post-World War I strikes.30 The company asked him to devise a
strategy to deal with them.31 Like Brandeis before him, Young "argued that
capitalists must provide alternate avenues of worker/management cooperation
if they wished to avoid strikes and radical agitations." 32 This advice led to one
of the first company unions. It was followed, when Young became chairman of
the board, by company-sponsored life insurance, mortgage benefits, pension
programs, and a general policy of employment security and wage stability.33
25. Young, supra note 24, at 389.
26. Id. at 390.
27. Id. at 391.
28. See id. at 392.
29. GE was the eleventh-largest company in the United States (as measured by value of
assets) in 1917 and the fifteenth-largest in 1930. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND
SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM app. A.1 at 642, app. A.2 at 649 (1990).
30. See Kim McQuaid, Young, Swope and General Electric's 'New Capitalism. A Study in
Corporate Liberalism, 1920-33, 36 AM.J. EcoN. & Soc. 323, 324-25 (1977).
31. See id. at 325.
32. Id. at 327.
33. See id.; see also CASE & CASE, supra note 24, at 252-61. Young was also a founder of the
Radio Corporation of America and, like Brandeis, active in national policymaking. See
CASE & CASE, supra note 24, at 182-91. He was the author of the Young Plan to reduce
footnote continued on next page
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Adolf Berle, a leading progressive lawyer and (with Gardiner Means) theorist
of corporate management, specifically identified GE under Young and Gerard
Swope as the ideal kind of client for Brandeisian legal counseling.34 Berle hoped
that this conception of business lawyering might "in time redeem the bulk of
the corporation bar from the profitable but usually undistinguished bondage in
which most of it lives."35
In the 1920s and 1930s, only a minority of liberal capitalists adopted the
Brandeis-Young model of business-statesmen guided by lawyer-statesmen. But
that model acquired new life in the "managerialist" era following World War
II. Somewhat ironically, given Brandeis's own strong preference for small,
competitive business firms over large ones, the principal spokesmen for the
view that corporate managers should guide their companies to act in the public
interest were mostly executives of large oligopolistic firms loosely associated
in a consortium called the Committee for Economic Development (CED). The
CED was organized in 1942 as a group of moderate businessmen interested in
influencing the planning of the postwar economy.36 After the war, the group
consistently represented the centrist wing of American business, relatively
friendly-compared to business organs like the National Association of
Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce-to government regulation and
social spending and relatively accommodating to labor unions.37 The CED's
influence and membership declined in the "stagflation" era of 1973 to 1980,
when the Business Roundtable supplanted it as the leading spokesman for big
business.38
German reparations debts and came close to being the Democratic presidential
nominee in 1932. Id. at 434-54, 553-72, 625-32. Young supported government interven-
tion to revive the economy in the 1930s but, like many other businessmen, eventually
turned against the New Deal. See id. at 548-52; McQuaid, supra note 30, at 332.
34. See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1372 (1932). Berle was echoing E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.'s praise for Swope and Young.
See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV.
1145, 1154-55 (1932).
35. Adolf A. Berle, Book Review, 76 HARY. L. REV. 430, 433 (1962) (reviewing BERYL
HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER?; THE NEW ROLE OF THE
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (1961)).
36. G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE MYTH OF LIBERAL ASCENDANCY: CORPORATE DOMINANCE
FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT RECESSION 30 (2013).
37. See id. at 55-83.
38. See MARK S. MIZRUCHI, THE FRACTURING OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE ELITE 171, 178
(2013); see also infra note 52 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the origins, rise,
and decline of the CED, see DOMHOFF, supra note 36, at 30-240. The CED eventually
abandoned the shrinking center and joined the Roundtable on the right in the years
leading up to Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency in 1980. Id. at 227-40.
1739
The Return of the Lawyer-Statesman?
69 STAN. L. REV. 1731(2017)
Leading theorists of managerialism, like Berle and the economist Robin
Marris,3 9 argued that a combination of imperfect competition and diffused
shareholders allowed managers the leeway to act in the role of "trustee[s]"
responsible for mediating among and satisfying a variety of stakeholder
claimants: workers, customers, suppliers, shareholders, creditors, communities
where a company did business, and "the public."40 Capably advised by lawyer-
counselors, the autonomous professional management hierarchy would
harmonize interests and develop wealth-enhancing technologies and business
strategies. Enhanced productivity would raise living standards for everyone
and avoid class conflict (what the historian Charles Maier memorably called
the "politics of productivity"41). Companies would cultivate largely cooperative
relationships with regulatory agencies while keeping overregulation at bay.
Such managers also accepted, if grudgingly, their unions, though confining the
union role to negotiations over wages, benefits, and working conditions while
retaining managerial prerogative to determine business strategy. 42 In this
period, public concern with the dangers of concentrated corporate power-
which had been the dominant issue of national politics in the United States
from the 1880s through the 1930s-largely disappeared from the political
agenda.43
Members of the CED supported tax hikes to reduce deficits and pay the
costs of wars and infrastructure spending, full employment as a proper goal of
fiscal and monetary policy, environmental protections, education spending
and reform, and even the war on poverty.44 They also perceived that there
were some public goods that needed government action because firms that
39. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164-77 (1954);
ROBIN MARRIS, THE EcoNoMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM 46-66 (1964).
40. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS: A
STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE 22-23 (1971).
41. Charles S. Maier, The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International
Economic Policy After World War II, 31 INT'L ORG. 607,613 (1977).
42. For a concise account of managerialist ideology, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1491-98 (1989). For the best of several accounts of the CED, see DOMHOFF, supra note 36,
at 34-185. For other examples, see generally ROBERT M. COLLINS, THE BUSINESS
RESPONSE TO KEYNES, 1929-1964 (1981); and KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER, BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
POLICY: THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1942-1967 (1967).
43. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 212-37 (1965) (positing
that concern with corporate power abated in postwar America because business was
seen as a mostly benign purveyor of economic abundance and because routine antitrust
enforcement was trusted to keep it in check).
44. See DOMHOFF, supra note 36, at 125-46.
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tried to provide them on their own would be at a competitive disadvantage. 45
Thus, there was a need for concerted action by business through associations
like the CED to lobby for public goods, including government provision of
public sector jobs to alleviate unemployment.
GE did not entirely subscribe to this benevolent cooperative vision in the
postwar period. Some of its senior executives were sent to jail for pricefixing in
the 1950s.46 The company continued the Young-Swope traditions of treating
its employees, shareholders, and consumers as "constituencies" whose interests
had to be coordinated and satisfied and of paying its workers high wages.47 But
after a bitter strike of electrical workers in 1946, during which the strikers had
locked managers out of their own plants, the company's labor relations became
more adversarial.48 Although GE treated the United Electrical Workers' union
as a fact of life, it also treated the union as a threat to be dealt with by red-
baiting its more leftist leaders, aggressive adversarial bargaining, and strike-
busting tactics.49 These tactics earned the label of "Boulwarism" after GE's
notoriously hardline Vice President for Labor and Community Relations,
Lemuel Boulware.50 GE also became an early adopter of a far-right
antigovernment ideology, as broadcast by its television spokesman in the 1950s
and 1960s, the actor Ronald Reagan.51
II. The Eclipse of Managerialism
The managerialist era ended in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the end
of the long postwar economic boom, stagflation, the oil embargo, and the rise
of foreign competition. 52 A new association, the Business Roundtable, was
45. See, e.g., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 40, at 57-58 (giving the examples of civil
rights laws, automobile safety regulation, and antipollution controls and incentives).
The CED supported the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See DOMHOFF, supra
note 36, at 180-82.
46. Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL: THE OFFENDER IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 103, 103-06 (Gilbert Geis
ed., 1968).
47. RONALD W. SCHATZ, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT GENERAL
ELECTRIC AND WESTINGHOUSE, 1923-60, at 169-70 (1983).
48. See KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE
MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN 93-97 (2009).
49. See SCHATZ, supra note 47, at 170-86; see also PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 48, at 97-110.
50. See SCHATZ, supra note 47, at 170; see also PHILLIPs-FEIN, supra note 48, at 100.
51. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 48, at 111-14.
52. See Ernie Englander & Allen Kaufman, The End of Managerial Ideology: From Corporate
Social Responsibility to Corporate Social Indifference, 5 ENTERPRISE & Soc'Y 404, 417-18
(2004) (specifying causes of the breakdown of managerialism).
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formed in 1972.53 This was a transitional organization, initially still
managerialist in its orientation: as late as 1990, its statement on corporate
responsibility still proposed that managers should be responsive to, mediate
among, and balance competing claims of multiple corporate stakeholders and
interests.54 These interests included supporting OSHA, civil rights laws, wage
and hour laws, and pension reform (ERISA); recognizing the desires of
employers "to have loyal and motivated employees"; and paying attention to
the long-term performance of the corporation.55
But by the late 1990s, the only function of this residue of managerialist
ideology was to explain why entrenched managers were entitled to resist
takeovers. Incidentally, Irving Shapiro-a lawyer who had spent a quarter of
his career in the Justice Department before becoming in-house counsel and
then CEO of DuPont-led the Roundtable.5 6 (A CEO of GE, Fred Borch, was
one of the Roundtable's principal founders;5 7 another, Jeffrey R. Immelt, sits on
the Roundtable's executive committee today.5 8 ) The view of Shapiro and the
Business Roundtable was that egalitarian social policy, regulation, and deficit
spending had transferred wealth from private to public hands and impeded the
ability to invest in new plants and technologies and that government policies
promoting full employment and collective bargaining led to dangerous levels
of inflation.59 So firm was their belief that all inflation was caused by labor's
push for higher wages that they even opposed giving food stamps to striking
workers.60 The Roundtable's main public program became cutting taxes, social
spending, and labor costs by reducing regulation and social welfare spending,
lowering worker expectations, and slashing payrolls.6 1 Thus, professional
management was still connected to a policy program and social vision, though
by this time a very conservative one. The older moderate-corporatist alliances
promoted by the CED were fractured and dissolved.62
53. History of Business Roundtable, Bus. ROUNDTABLE, http://businessroundtable.org/about/
history (last visited June 6, 2017).
54. Bus. Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness: March, 1990, 46 Bus.
LAW. 241, 244-45 (1990).
55. Id.
56. Claudia H. Deutsch, Irving S. Shapiro, 85, Lawyer and Ex-Chairman of DuPont, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2001), https://nyti.ms/2ptSlfq.
57. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 48, at 192.
58. Jeffrey R. Immelt, Bus. ROUNDTABLE, http://businessroundtable.org/about/members/
jeffrey-r-immelt (last visited June 6, 2017).
59. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 48, at 194-95.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 206-12.
62. See MIZRUCHI, supra note 38, at 171-79.
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Meanwhile, once the takeover threat subsided, so did social responsibility
as a reason for allowing managers to resist it. Managers now accepted the new
doctrine-whose Johns the Baptist had been Milton Friedman; Henry Manne;
and the Chicago School economists Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen, and William
Meckling-that the business firm was only a "nexus of contracts," that
managers' only principals were shareholders, and that a business has no
responsibility except to make profits for its shareholders. 63 The Business
Roundtable officially adopted the "managers as agents of shareholders only"
view in its 1997 Statement on Corporate Governance. 64 As management was
now compensated largely with stock options that supposedly aligned its
interests with those of shareholders, this came to mean, in effect, that managers
had no responsibility except to make as much money for themselves as
possible.65 As Rakesh Khurana66 has put it, the new gospel of management self-
enrichment "helped create the conditions and standards of behavior through
which the market-based mechanism of stock options was turned into an
instrument for defrauding investors, jeopardizing the livelihoods of
employees, and undermining public trust in managers and corporations."67
Now the only obligation of managers, working solely for their own benefit,
was to produce quarterly profits-or at least the illusion of quarterly profits-
until the bubbles burst and the music stopped.
63. For two of the core papers that expound this thesis, see Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 289 (1980); and Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11, 357 (1976). For an excellent
summary and acute critique of the "nexus of contracts" view of the corporation, see
William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407,409-11 (1989).
64. Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance 1-4 (1997).
65. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS To HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 317-26 (2007). Khurana notes that, consistent with this
new emphasis on the manager as a self-seeking profit-maximizer, business schools
came to be ranked by the incomes and networking opportunities of their graduates. Id.
at 335-42.
66. Khurana's brilliant history of business education and ideology describes how the tie
between managers and other corporate stakeholders was broken. The Trojan horse in
his account was the Ford Foundation's plan to upgrade the intellectual quality of elite
business schools and provide rigorous training for the profession of business in the
1950s and 1960s. The plan was to bring academic disciplines into the business schools
and use them to produce skilled technocratic managers. See id. at 239-82. Very quickly,
economics and quantitative methods came to dominate the curriculum. Id. at 273-78.
The content was Max Weber's nightmare, a purely instrumental rationality divorced
from any normative goals or purposes. See id. at 379-80.
67. Id. at 375.
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III. Managers as Amoral Profit-Seekers and Lawyers as Amoral
Servants of Clients
After a long debate on what constituencies corporate managers should
serve and what social goals they should pursue, by the 1980s a consensus
seemed to form that managers should serve only their shareholders and should
have no social goals except making money.68 This orthodox view of the
corporation as the amoral profit-seeking servant of its stockholders is, I
believe, disturbing enough on its own terms. But it becomes positively
frightening when coupled with the orthodox view of the lawyer as the equally
amoral zealous servant of his client, bound to navigate around or minimize or
eliminate any legal obstacles standing in the way of the client's business
objectives.69
Milton Friedman, ahead of his time as the most famous and influential
advocate of corporate self-seeking and critic of "corporate social responsibil-
ity," was aware that self-seeking was subject to limitations. The "only ... social
responsibility of business," he argued, is to "increase its profits.'90 But he
immediately recognized the need for constraints on profit-seeking: "That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with [the owners']
68. For the classic contributions beginning the debate, see A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers
as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); Berle, supra note 34, at 1367, 1372;
Dodd, supra note 34, at 1145-46; and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 194-95 (1935).
For an able and acute summary of the ups and downs of the subsequent debates as the
desirability of corporate social responsibility and service to multiple stakeholders rose
and fell in the academic and business literature, see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51
U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). For the most rigorous and effective statement of what I am
calling the "consensus view," see David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1979).
69. For some classic expositions (though they are accompanied by critiques) of the standard
conception of the lawyer as zealous advocate for her client, see Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Rolec A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615-19; and William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 39-61. This
conception is codified (with qualifications) in the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics: "The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by
the rules of law, legally applied." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 15 (AM.
BAR Ass'N 1980). It is also codified in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
preamble: "These principles [underlying the Rules] include the lawyer's obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the
law...."MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
70. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, at 124 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
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desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while con-
forming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied
in ethical custom."71 Profit-seeking is a praiseworthy end "so long as [the business]
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud."72 Friedman suggested that if
corporate managers follow their own views of desirable social policy and spend
their owners' money on favored social causes-the example he gave was
decisions to protect the environment more than the law requires-then they
are taxing the owners without democratic process.73 The legal "rules of the
game," by contrast, are legitimate because they are made by elected officials
through democratic processes. 74 Businessmen, Friedman argued, should stay
out of public policy formation:
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making maximum
profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it is? Can self-selected
private individuals decide what the social interest is? Can they decide how great a
burden they are justified in placing on themselves or their stockholders to serve
that social interest? Is it tolerable that these public functions of taxation,
expenditure, and control be exercised by the people who happen at the moment
to be in charge of particular enterprises, chosen for those posts by strictly private
groups? If businessmen are civil servants rather than the employees of their
stockholders then in a democracy they will, sooner or later, be chosen by the
public techniques of election and appointment. 7 5
Friedman's sounds like a killer argument against the managerialist
program of pursuing social goals other than those of making money for
shareholders. 76 (Of course, managers who adopt such a program may claim that
pursuing such goals will aid the long-run profitability of the enterprise.) But
the argument's apparent simplicity is rather deceptive. Friedman divides the
world into two spheres, one of private self-seeking in the market, the other of
democratically legitimated controls on such self-seeking, which we call law. He
pictures the corporation as a passive law-taker, maximizing profits within the
hard constraints supplied by law. There are business decisions and political
decisions. Managers are to make business decisions and leave politics to the
politicians.
71. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 124 (emphasis added) (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 133).
73. See id. at 33.
74. As a committed libertarian, of course, Friedman objected to many of the laws passed by
democratic majorities. But he did not doubt that businesses had to follow them.
75. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 133-34.
76. Friedman's basic argument is endorsed, though with some recognition of problems
with it, by what is probably the most careful and sophisticated treatment of corporate
social responsibility in the legal literature. See Engel, supra note 68, at 29-30, 30 n.87.
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But that does not sound like anything in the real world. Corporations are
anything but passive or neutral with respect to compliance with legal limits on
their conduct. There is an entire profession-ours-whose work is devoted to
making apparently hard constraints soft and malleable. Lawyers are skilled at
the law evasion game-exploiting interpretive ambiguities in statutes,
regulations, or case law; stalling underfunded and understaffed enforcement
regimes by exhausting their resources; hiding doubtful dealings under the
cloak of confidentiality; inventing ingenious shelters to conceal the sources of
taxable gains or move them to low-tax jurisdictions; or writing elaborate
opinion letters that seem to reassure regulators and third parties that corporate
dealings are sound.77 In short, lawyers often treat the law, the supposed rules of
the game, as stuff to be gamed and manipulated in their clients' interest.
Sometimes they even claim that engaging in this gaming of the rules is
protecting the "rule of law."78 This hyperformal interpretation of that concept
suggests that if the state wants to bring sovereign force to bear on a private
party, it has to do so in language that is textually unambiguous and
unmistakably clear.79 Because almost no statutory or regulatory language can
ever fully satisfy that requirement,80 in effect the formal ideal of the "rule of
law" is being used to subvert the actual rule of law. The actual rule of law
includes the constraints of the legal framework as they would be interpreted in
good faith by a judge or other official or even just a citizen who respects the
outcome of democratic process-that is, understood by reference to the
manifest purposes or goals that the law is seeking to attain.
Yet if, as Friedman asserts, managers usurp the province of legal authori-
ties when they do more than the law requires, it must also be true that
contravening the law, or doing less than it requires, must also violate the public
rules of society made by democratic processes. Who are the managers to
arrogate to themselves the legitimacy to decide that tax or environmental or
occupational safety or product liability laws cut too far into their profits and
therefore may rightly be evaded? These are all distributional decisions that
individual companies and their managers would seem to have no right to
make.
77. If things turn out badly, of course, counsel can say that they relied on facts supplied by
clients and clients that they relied on advice of counsel.
78. See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REv. 848, 857 (1991).
79. See id. at 849, 857-59.
80. It would require a separate treatise to substantiate this assertion. Anyone who doubts
that an aggressive interpreter can manufacture ambiguity out of virtually any text
might consider how difficult it has been for advocates of textual formalism in statutory
interpretation to find that what they construe as "plain meanings" are equally plain to
other interpreters. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 621-23 (1990).
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One way some lawyers-including notable scholars of corporate govern-
ance-have tried to finesse this problem is by reinterpreting what "law" means
so as to minimize its significance as a constraint on profit-seeking. They restate
law as simply a price on conduct8 l-the view of Oliver Wendell Holmes's
classic "bad man" whose only interest in law is in whether its sanctions,
discounted by the probability of detection and enforcement, are likely to
impose more costs than the benefits of violation. 82 If the managers will make
more money by violating the law, taking the risk of fines and jail terms, they
not only may but must do so. This solves the problem how to reconcile
subversion of legal rules with maximum profits for the shareholders but at a
rather high cost. It deprives law, supposedly the legitimate voice of the people,
of any normative content. It is also a recipe for anarchy. No government can
ever be strong enough to enforce its laws against powerful interests, well
fortified with lawyers, determined to nullify those laws.
There is still another problem with Friedman's formula (lawmakers make
the laws; businessmen maximize profits while complying with the laws). What
business clients often want from their lawyers, if the lawyers cannot succeed in
minimizing or nullifying legal obstacles to their plans, are changes in the
overall rules of the game that will generally benefit, or loopholes or
exemptions that will specifically benefit, their bottom lines.83 If government is
the only legitimate judge of how and how much to regulate in the event of
market failures, or to provide public goods like a livable planet, how can a
corporation acting under Friedman's rules properly spend its resources to
influence those decisions? The dilemma should be even more painful for
industries that are engaged in pure rent-seeking-of privileges, monopoly
rights, government contracts, exemptions from taxes or weakening of
81. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) ("Managers have no general obligation to avoid
violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm .... We put to one
side laws concerning violence or other acts thought to be malum in se." (citations
omitted)). Under Easterbrook and Fischel's view,
managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just because the laws
exist. They must determine the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names for
disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the
rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not only may but
also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.
Id. at 1177 n.57.
82. For an excellent exposition and critique of law-as-price, see W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2005).
83. Managers may also lobby for rules (such as those regulating executive compensation)
that make it easier for them to engage in self-dealing, but such rule changes are
presumably unappealing to both Friedmanites and corporate social responsibility
types.
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regulations affecting those industries in particular, immunity from or limits on
tort liability, below-market leases of public lands, and the like.
The response might be: this is all just the activity of citizens engaging in
the ordinary process of pluralist interest group bargaining. The managers are
just making their contributions to the democratic decisionmaking process.
So they are, but if you are a committed Friedmanite, the managers have no
business spending the corporation's money trying to produce a distributive
outcome, even if the one they want may also increase the company's profits.
They are still operating outside their legitimate sphere. It makes no sense to
argue that the managers may lobby to relax environmental regulations but
may not donate a million dollars to Americans for Prosperity or the Club for
Growth to lobby on their behalf. If they may operate in the public sphere,
guided by their judgments about where their enlightened self-interest lies,
surely they should be able to lobby to strengthen the EPA or give to the Sierra
Club or the Natural Resources Defense Council.
Of course, Friedman and others with views more liberal than his are right
to worry about what will happen if corporations step outside their sphere of
"profit-seeking within the rules" and start to game the rules or engage in
politics to change the rules. Throughout our history people have worried that
business corporations, with their ability to aggregate capital and hire expensive
lawyers and lobbyists, will corrupt and overwhelm democratic institutions. In
the early republic, legislatures tried to impose safeguards against corporate
entities by limiting their powers and capitalization.84 By the mid-nineteenth
century, legislatures sought to prevent corporate capture by limiting what
states could do to benefit corporations (such as investing public money in them
or exempting them from taxes or liabilities).85 In the late nineteenth century,
the main instrument of control was supposed to be antitrust laws.86 Closer to
our times, state and federal governments have tried to contain corporate
influence in politics by forbidding them to spend money on elections or ballot
initiatives.87 Most of these controls are now gone. Our constitutional law has
84. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 39-45 (1970).
85. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 72-75 (1997).
86. See generally James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989) (noting that
vigorous antitrust enforcement was believed to be the crucial precondition to keeping
free markets competitive).
87. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115-32 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,767-68 (1978).
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demolished most of these restrictions on corporations as political actors,
recognizing them as full participants in the public sphere.88
And on most issues that matter to them, business firms are the eight-
hundred-pound gorillas, much stronger than the parties most likely to try to
enforce the legal constraints: underfunded and understaffed government
agencies, private plaintiffs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or public
interest lawyers. And a corporate entity determined to get its own way can
often count on its lawyers to overwhelm such adversaries with expensive legal
procedures or to disarm them in advance by means of nondisclosure
agreements; mandatory arbitration clauses excluding class actions; or the
purchase of expensive, biased expertise claiming that no harm has been done or
that, if it has, the company did not cause it.89 Corporate efforts to undermine
legal constraints often elude scrutiny altogether because they are conducted
under the radar, in anterooms of legislative committees or regulation writers,
or during phone calls between well-connected business executives and agency
heads. 0 These are serious obstacles to enforcement even in countries with
well-functioning and well-resourced regulatory states. In many countries
where multinationals do business, where public agencies are weak and
enforcement budgets low, and where officials are easily bribed to look the
other way, the amoral corporation can operate without any effective
constraints at all except the resistance of local power blocs.9 1
So in the real world, the strictures of Friedman and his supporters-that
corporate managers should stick to their knitting and keep their noses out of
the public sphere and its unavoidably controversial distributive politics-are
not observed. There is abundant evidence (some of it cited above) of corporate
managers as active participants in the public sphere. We usually suppose that
people acting as citizens have some obligation to serve the interests of the
public as well as their own. Are corporations different? Should managers be
driven in their political aims, as in their business aims, by the sole goal of
maximizing profits for their shareholders? 92
88. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341-43; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-86.
89. See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO
GLOBAL WARMING 240-44, 248 (2010) (recounting how companies commissioned
research from scientists casting doubt on corporate causation of harms).
90. For a textbook example, see Haley Sweetland Edwards, He Who Makes the Rules, WASH.
MONTHLY (Mar./Apr. 2013), http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril
-2013/he-who-makes-the-rules, which discusses attempts to weaken Dodd-Frank
regulations of banking practices.
91. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM 9-35 (1999).
92. As far as I am aware, very little has been written on the ethics of corporations as
citizens or of lawyers as agents of corporate citizens.
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If so, we have to accept as a normative ideal the model of the self-seeking
profit-driven corporation, powering ahead with its lawyers on the lookout for
inconvenient legal or moral constraints on its conduct, prepared to blow past
them or zap them out of existence. Predatory companies with aggressive legal
staffs can inflict a lot of damage on others' persons and property-stealing
lawfully owed wages, skimming off undisclosed fees from customers, seizing
foreclosed property to which they do not have title, pouring cyanide-laced
tailings into neighbors' drinking water, bribing officials to obtain advantages
denied to more honest competitors, and obtaining monopoly rights to
necessities like water or pharmaceuticals-without having to pay for it or be
subject to effective controls.93 The central legal rules are the framework rules
that constitute the market itself. There is no market without the rules; there is
only anarchy. If your company pollutes my air and water, that is not just an
unfortunate side effect of productive activity; it is a violation of my
fundamental property rights, a trespass and invasion. You should stop doing it
or at the very least pay me for your right to pollute (or, for devotees of the
Coase Theorem, give me the opportunity to pay you to stop 94).
These examples, of course, are not dystopian fantasies of hypothetical
dangers. They describe the everyday activities of many companies, some
bearing famous names.95 The amoral corporation guided by the amoral zealous
advocate is potentially a monster, a powerful engine of destruction, a licensed
sociopath. Somehow we have talked ourselves into the position that this is an
acceptable normative view of the purposes of the corporation and an
acceptable view of the role and ethics of a lawyer.
Yet even extreme libertarians cannot endorse the nullification of basic
rights-protecting law. The only people who could would be Randian admirers
of the arch-selfish entrepreneur as the heroic agent of creative change 96-or,
less dramatically, those convinced that the wealth created for such companies
and their shareholders, even if it ends up in a very few hands, justifies all the
damage done to produce it. This ideology sometimes amounts to little more
than vulgar libertarian Babbitry-"business good, government bad."
93. For an excellent recent book cataloguing such practices, see THOMAS 0. McGARITY,
FREEDOM To HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013).
94. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-15 (1960) (theorizing that
absent transaction costs, it makes no difference whether the polluter has to pay for the
right to pollute or the pollutee has to pay the polluter because the parties can bargain to
an efficient solution).
95. For a work featuring a comprehensive and scholarly compendium of damage inflicted
by prominent companies and facilitated by sustained political assaults on regulatory
controls, see McGARITY, supra note 93.
96. See AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957); AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943).
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IV. Corporate Counseling in Practice
1ow, I hasten to say there is no reason to think that all or even most
corporate managers engage in amoral, reckless, and socially destructive self-
seeking or that their lawyers believe it is their sworn duty as zealous advocates
to help them do so. Such sociological literature as there is on the role of
corporate counsel suggests that actual practice varies quite a lot. Some lawyers
feel comfortable in the role of gatekeeper or "cop," actively pressing their
clients to avoid stepping over legal limits.97 Others assume the role of
entrepreneur or "adversarialist," a partner with the business managers in
trying to aggressively game legal constraints.9 8 Doreen McBarnet's rather
chilling studies of corporate lawyers show that the very raison d'stre of certain
segments of the corporate bar, their source of "value" for the client, lies in their
ability to game regulatory and taxing regimes-to find ways over, under,
around, and through new forms of regulation designed to curb risky behavior
and tax evasion.99 "Don't worry too much about Dodd-Frank (or any other
regulation)," one can picture them telling their clients-"we'll find ways to get
around it, and in the meantime our lobbyists will be working to weaken the
rules." Certainly many law firms advertise themselves to prospective clients as
"creative," "forward-leaning," and "entrepreneurial" with respect to legal
risks. 00
It is likely-and of course I am guessing here, as no comprehensive study of
corporate lawyers' ethics has ever been undertaken or likely ever will be, given
difficulties of access and the rules of confidentiality and privilege-that most
in-house lawyers are neither aggressive gatekeeper-cops nor aggressive
entrepreneurs but simply cautious advisors on legal risk. In-house lawyers, as
Sung Hui Kim has pointed out, are subject to enormous pressures to simply
facilitate-and not be seen to obstruct-the wishes of client managers: as
employees within a hierarchy, as peers connected by ties of loyalty and
solidarity to work teams, and as professionals with ethical duties to zealously
97. See Sung Hui Kim, The Ethics of In-House Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL
DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 197, 198-99 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012);
Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs Constructing the
Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 457, 463-64 (2000);
Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance Preliminary Findings and New
Research 9Questions, 21 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 470-74 (2008).
98. See Christine E. Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business
Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 224-28, 238-41 (2009).
99. See Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal
Integrity and the Banking Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 67, 68-69
(lain G. MacNeil & Justin O'Brien eds., 2010).
100. For examples, see Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism Core
Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 1126-32 (2007).
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pursue client interests.10 1 In-house lawyers are like financial risk managers-
somewhat marginalized within the business, having to cultivate trust relations
with operational managers to be seen as members of the team, always ready to
suggest alternative means of achieving a manager's objective if some legal
obstacle appears rather than simply saying "no." "No" has to be used sparingly,
reserved for actions that risk serious criminal liability1 02 and rationed even
then, lest the lawyer be perceived as an obstructive troublemaker and never
consulted. The safest course for lawyers is to take a relatively passive role: to
assume that whichever manager consults them is their "client" (even if that
manager seems to be proposing action that might disserve the actual client, the
corporate entityl0 3), to present the manager with options and estimates of legal
risk likely to attach to each, and to let the manager decide (while adding a
covering memo to the file noting that they have advised on legal risk).'1' In
101. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1041-52 (2005).
102. Lawyers who treat actions that might result in criminal liability as lines not to be
crossed are clearly treating law as a set of norms, not as simply a price on conduct to be
discounted by the probability of detection and enforcement. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text. From a purely "bad man's" view of costs and benefits, however,
their clients need not usually fear much adverse state action. See generally BRANDON L.
GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 3-18
(2014) (observing that despite the vast expansion in recent decades of the criminal code
of corporate offenses, neither companies nor their managers are often prosecuted and
that when they are, they are usually allowed to defer prosecution on the condition that
they take remedial action).
103. For a discussion of the tendency of both lawyers and corporate law doctrine to conflate
manager and entity, see William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 489, 490-91 (2016); and Simon, supra note 15, at 62-65.
104. For wonderful interviews of in-house counsel for British corporations, see CRISTINA
GODINHO ET AL., LAWYERS' ETHICS IN THE CORPORATE WORLD: IN-HOUSE LAWYERS,
LEGAL RISK AND THE TOURNAMENT OF INFLUENCE (forthcoming Dec. 2017) (on file with
author). As one interviewee explains,
what you mustn't do is say no to anyone, that's a big, big mistake.... But very rarely do you get
a question, the question is more like what will happen if? The lawyer is probably guessing
with huge experience and knowledge, and the guess might be in the right ballpark but it's still
a guess. Much, much better to give options to a management team and to indicate the degree of
risk with each one, and then let the management team form its own view about it, try and get
the dialogue going. If you can form that kind of relationship then you will grow the legal
service.
Id. (manuscript at 113) (alteration in original) (italics omitted). There is also risk
management through information control: do not write anything down, do not leave a
paper trail, and make sure any reports are covered by privilege. Other excerpts from
the interviews include:
If there's a criminal matter [the business proposes] you'd hope they'd agree and if they didn't
agree leave. It's often not as stark as that. What it is has been in my experience is that you're in
a culture within a firm where you're constantly having to swim against the tide and being
pressured. Senior management and the business people know amongst their group of lawyers
who is nice and easy and compliant and who isn't. . . . They're very smart at getting their
business interests put first, so they will try and pick off compliant people and have them
footnote continued on next page
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this role, the lawyer is simply a neutral risk assessor, an advocate neither for
legal compliance nor for legal avoidance or evasion.
The Harvard Manifesto and Heineman's book represent a sharp challenge
to conventional views of the corporate lawyer as an active gamer of legal
constraints on corporate profit-seeking or a neutral assessor of legal risk whose
advice may passively enable violations of law. From here, this Essay focuses on
Heineman's book because it lays out the most comprehensive and detailed
vision of an in-house counsel as a lawyer-statesman who promotes public
values and the rule of law as well as the self-interest of his client company.
In a pessimistic 2009 assessment of the current status of the historical ideal
of the lawyer-statesman or lawyer-citizen, I wrote that "[t]he citizen lawyer
may one day stage a comeback, and I hope she does; but present conditions are
not favorable."105 Heineman does want to bring it back-he explicitly pitches
his work as a revival of the lawyer-statesman ideal-and believes it can be
realized in the role of in-house counsel.1 06 This ideal is that of a genuinely
independent advisor who occupies a dual role: he not only guides clients
through the maze of law and regulation to help realize the company's profit
goals but also affirmatively promotes the company's compliance with law and
fosters cooperation with other companies to engage in collective action for the
public good.1 07 He describes the task as balancing "high performance with high
integrity" to resolve the "partner-guardian tension." 0 8
dedicated, . . . [to] get this bank within the bank culture. They'd choose their lawyers that
facilitate their business.
So what happens ... if you don't accommodate the business needs and you question things
and you highlight risk and you're objective and exercise judgement[?] . . . [Y]ou're just not
picked by those people and you end up not doing what some people might call the best work
in the bank or the most high profile[;] you can get side-lined.
Id. (manuscript at 121) (first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh alterations in original).
It's not the job of the lawyer to [make the decisions], beyond keeping us out of jail and making
sure we don't go bust from a legally generated risk. The rest of the job as a lawyer is to make
sure that the business has a calibration of the risk and takes an informed decision; we're
advisors, not deciders, and that's the frame.... [I]f you can't get across those three basis [sic]
then you haven't done your job properly.
Id. (manuscript at 124) (first alteration in original); see also id. ("I would [raise resigning]
if it was something that I felt was criminal activity; I'd have to." (alteration in original)).
The authors found that while "lawyers and businesses like to project a belief in legality
or working within the law, in reality this often meant something different": the
"elision of legality with criminal law was common." Id. One interview respondent
demonstrated "how quietly [that] qualification can be introduced": "Well[] no breaking
the law. I think the foundation of any sustainable company has to be honest numbers
and compliance with the law. So that's no breaking the criminal law." Id.
105. Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some
Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169,1206 (2009).
106. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 31-42.
107. See, e.g., id. at 317-18.
108. Id. at 55 (emphasis omitted).
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Heineman's book is a somewhat ungainly object-part autobiography, part
operations manual for in-house counsel, part didactic tract with cautionary
tales of lawyers and companies gone over to the dark side. It is often repetitive,
with tendencies to overuse corporate buzzwords and slogans. "Integrity," for
example, is a term that stands in for too many different things-honest and fair
business dealings, respect for the normative goals of law, concern for various
corporate constituencies, regard for the social consequences of corporate
policies and actions, and leadership in proposing collective action to mitigate
bad effects. But the book's central message is forceful and clear-and
sufficiently specific to absolve it of being just another public relations
advertisement for corporate altruism and virtue.
The book also gains credibility from the impressive credentials and
experience of its author. Heineman is a sort of superstar among lawyers. After a
Supreme Court clerkship, he worked as a public interest lawyer for the Center
for Law and Social Policy and served as a government lawyer in the Carter
Administration, rising to the rank of Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.10 9 He was
the managing partner of Sidley Austin's Washington office when Jack Welch,
the newly anointed CEO of GE, asked him to become GE's general counsel.1 10
He remained at GE from 1987 to 2005 under Welch and his successor, Jeffrey
Immelt, supervising an in-house legal staff that grew to over 1200 lawyers
operating in over one hundred countries.11 1 He was one of the first in-house
counsel to build his office into something like a major law firm that conducted
most of the client company's legal work, contracting out specialty work to
outside law firms as needed.112
Heineman articulates a vision of the general counsel's role that is in many
ways at odds with 1980s-era managers and lawyers' ethics. He emphatically
rejects the Jensen-Meckling thesis that the sole task of management is to
maximize shareholder value, as measured by short-term share price, and
resurrects the managerialist view that the corporation has responsibilities to its
many constituencies-including employees, customers, creditors, suppliers,
and communities.113 He also rejects both the "bad man's" view of law as simply
a price on conduct and the view of law as texts to be construed formally and
109. See Resume of Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. 1-2 (n.d.), http://docplayer.net/1296731
-Resume-benjamin-w-heineman-jr-home-harvard-i-employment.html; see also Ben W.
Heineman, Jr.: Short Form Bio (n.d.), http://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/files/fi1es/
BiographyHeinemanBenjaminW.pdf.
110. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 8, 15; see also Resume of Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr.,
supra note 109, at 1.
111. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 8, 40.
112. See id.at 8-10, 15, 40.
113. Id. at 282-85.
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technically rather than in the light of their "real purpose[s]" and likely social
consequences.11 4 He urges company lawyers to respect the law as embodying
norms, or "binding judgments made by a society's duly authorized legal and
political processes," and argues that "[g]lobal corporations must give deference
to the law of the nation in which they choose to operate, even if there is some
discretion in determining what is the law of that society.""l5 A general counsel
must say "no" to clearly illegal conduct. But the lawyer-statesman must ask
what is right as well as what is legal. And more than that, he must ask what the
long-term global economic, policy, and cultural tendencies are that may affect
the corporation's future and to develop strategies to anticipate them. Heineman
calls for-and his career exemplifies-a powerful and proactive general
counsel, not a team of lawyers waiting passively to be consulted by business
managers.
Heineman gives many examples of corporate scandals facilitated, he
believes, by lawyers taking a passive role, turning a blind eye to violations: the
well-known Enron scandal;116 the Siemens massive global bribery cases;" 7 the
General Motors ignition switch failure;" 8 Apple's problems with subcontrac-
tors in its supply chain abusing its manufacturing labor force;119 JPMorgan
Chase's multiple scandals (London Whale, LIBOR ratefixing, and money
laundering);1 20 the Walmart Mexico bribery scandal, which Walmart's local
general counsel arranged to cover up;12 1 and Volkswagen's rigging its
emissions detectors to fool regulators.1 22 In each of these cases, he suggests,
there was a serious failure of controls from the general counsel's office,1 23 and
in some, such as Walmart's, there was active complicity by the general
counsel's office.124
Heineman is particularly interested in "citizenship and the primacy of
public policy."125 He does not like the term "corporate social responsibility"
because it has come to mean largely decorative voluntary philanthropy, such as
114. Id. at 35, 140-41.
115. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).
116. See id. at 101-02.
117. See id. at 99-101.
118. See id. at 96-99.
119. See id. at 206-07.
120. See id. at 102-06.
121. See id. at 166-68.
122. See id. at 108.
123. See sources cited supra notes 116-22.
124. HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 166-67.
125. See id. at 317-57 (formatting altered).
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charitable contributions to the local symphony or United Way.1 26 The
corporation needs to be a republican citizen and a participant in public policy
formation, not just a rent-seeking special interest.127 It must actively "help
secure public goods, which are vital to societal well-being but which cannot be
realized through the market." 128 Partly Heineman means that the company's
own policies should be directed at reducing harmful externalities; he mentions
reducing air and water pollution and hazardous waste and instituting wellness,
labor safety, sick leave, and parental leave programs for the company's own
and its suppliers' employees.1 29
The primary idea Heineman advocates is that the general counsel take the
initiative to organize consortia of companies to influence governments in
order to "seek a collective public policy solution on these 'indirect' issues that
addresses an important 'non-market' problem . . . and that is also enforceable
(which voluntary action or industry agreements are not)."1 30 He expresses a
broad commitment to supporting policies that sustain and improve the
environment in which the company lives and breathes-improved education,
scientific research, infrastructure updates, policies affecting climate change,
antipoverty and public health programs, and security and antiterrorism
measures, among others.131 Heineman thinks that the general business
associations like the Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce tend to
advance "'lowest common denominator' positions that are heavily slanted
toward business or are a vague collection of business bromides or both." 3 2 He
believes that the solution is to recruit other companies and other organizations
into "coalition[s] of the willing" to pressure for such policies.1 33 He cites as
examples initiatives he took at GE: pressing for an executive agreement with
other countries that would strengthen the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which was finally achieved in 1997;134 the U.S. Climate Action Partnership of
major companies to develop a cap-and-trade regime that would limit use of
greenhouse gases;1 35 and an asbestos trust fund that would take asbestos injury
126. See id. at 318.
127. Id. at 317-18.
128. Id. at 317.
129. Id. at 325-26.
130. Id. at 345-46.
131. Id. at 345.
132. Id. at 346.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 327-29 (noting that, after ratification, the agreement became effective in 1999).
135. Id. at 346-47.
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cases out of the courts and put them into an administrative compensation
system.136 These last two unfortunately failed.137
V. Some Questions About Heineman's Project
These all seem like fairly progressive initiatives-much like those that
corporate members of the CED supported in its heyday 13 8-and I, for one, very
much welcome the call to major multinational companies to support them. But
there is no guarantee that corporations mobilized around public policy causes
will not choose (what people like me would consider) very bad ones: we would
rather such companies focus narrowly on making money than seek to
influence broad policy formation. Yet it seems unlikely that businesses that
push for progressive causes will inspire antiprogressive forces to mobilize if
they otherwise would not. The Koch brothers, Chamber of Commerce,
Business Roundtable, and National Federation of Independent Business, among
many others, are mobilized already. Business firms do not need much
provocation to lobby for policies that benefit their bottom lines-like lower
taxes, less regulation, or fewer labor protections.
A big question Heineman's project raises is why a company's legal depart-
ment is the appropriate agent to enact these ambitious programs. What is it
about lawyers that renders them competent to give policy advice, as well as
strictly legal advice, and to lead the way in organizing other companies to join
in collective public policy formation? In particular, given Heineman's repeated
emphasis on the corporate client's need for ethical as well as legal advice and on
"doing the right thing" as well as the profitable and law-compliant thing, why
are lawyers peculiarly qualified and well situated to serve as the corporation's
moral guide?
Construing the lawyer as policy advisor and policy entrepreneur is easier
to do. Lawyers presumably gain some knowledge of policy from their training
and experience. Legal education infused with insights from the legal realist and
law and economics movements is partly an education in policy.1 39 Heineman's
136. I at 347.
137. Id.
138. As it happens, Heineman's father, Ben W. Heineman, Sr., was a lawyer, speechwriter
for Adlai Stevenson, advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson, president of the Chicago
and North Western Railway, and one of the charter members of the CED. See
DOMHOFF, supra note 36, at 135, 175; Denise Grady, Ben Heineman, Multifaceted
Businessman, Dies at 98, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), https://nyti.ms/MEd4YJ.
139. "Legal realism" was a movement of legal intellectuals writing in the 1920s and 1930s
whose work had a profound effect on legal reasoning. Among the movement's tenets
were that formal legal arguments conceal what are really issues of public policy and
that judges and lawyers should identify and use policy analysis to resolve them. Robert
W. Gordon, "Legal Realism," in A COMPANION To AMERICAN THOUGHT 392, 392-93
footnote continued on next page
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view that law (or some law, anyway) expresses norms that have binding
authority because of their adoption through democratic processes and that
lawyers must interpret law in light of its manifest purposes presupposes that
lawyers are likely to have some insight into those purposes. Heineman tells us
that he made a practice of hiring lawyers with government, and thus policy,
experience. 140
But what about lawyers' moral authority? The theory is not well devel-
oped in Heineman's book, but the basic idea is that company lawyers with
experience outside the company-perhaps especially with experience in
government-as litigators or transactional lawyers accustomed to having to see
things from others' points of view may be exceptionally qualified to detect
adverse reactions and reputational harm. Their job is to ask: What if this
practice were exposed in tomorrow's New York Times or on the front page of
the Wall Street Journal? The lawyer may not perhaps himself be blessed with a
superior moral disposition or instincts but is something of an expert in
anticipating moral reactions in others-how, for instance, a jury (to take an
example from the Ford Pinto casel 41 ) might respond to evidence that company
engineers were willing to subject drivers to the risk of an exploding gas tank to
save a few dollars per car. The lawyer is something like Adam Smith's
"impartial spectator," the "man within the breast," who regulates his own
conduct by imagining the reactions of others.1 42 Executives who have spent
most of their lives in a corporate culture tend to develop a tribal mentality, an
"us versus the outside world" view in which loyalty is not just a primary virtue
but the only virtue, and to close ranks against the enemy-plaintiffs, NGO
critics, and bureaucrats.1 43 Perhaps lawyers-or some lawyers, anyway-bring
to the corporation a more cosmopolitan and less parochial viewpoint, more
aware of the institutional and cultural infrastructures in which the company
must operate, because their social and political experiences are often much
more diverse and extensive than the managers'.
(Richard Wightman Fox &.James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995). "Law and economics" (or
"economic analysis of law") is a generic name for several schools of legal intellectuals
writing since 1960. Like the realists, law and economics scholars believe that legal
arguments are, at bottom, disputes over policy and that economic analysis provides
useful methods for identifying efficient resolutions to those disputes. See generally
Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of
Law, Coase Lecture (Jan. 6, 1998), in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 189
(Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
140. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 340.
141. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358-61 (Ct. App. 1981).
142. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 161-65, 208-20 (Arlington House
1969) (1759).
143. For an analysis of tribalism, see ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF
CORPORATE MANAGERS 49-55 (1988).
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To be sure, there are many reasons to doubt whether inside counsel can
actually play this role-as employee, faithful agent and advocate, and team
player-with all the pressures to conform and cognitive biases that come along
with it.144 A prominent securities law scholar recently observed that if a
corporation were serious about actually complying with some law or
regulation-environmental, safety, antidiscrimination, workplace harassment,
anti-foreign corruption, antifraud, or anything else-it might do well to locate
responsibility for compliance in some other set of specialists besides lawyers,
given lawyers' almost reflexive instincts to try to interpret constraints out of
existence or behave like "attack dog[s]" against interests perceived as hostile.1 45
And there are reasons to be skeptical about how far Heineman's experience at
GE can be generalized to other companies. His situation was pretty special,
after all. Jack Welch personally recruited Heineman for the job. Welch and
Immelt gave him solid backing for the expansive, proactive role his general
counsel's office performed within the company. He had unhampered access to
the board of directors and its independent committees. He had hierarchical
control over all the lawyers, inside and outside, serving the company.'4 There
was less risk than in many companies (for instance, Enron) that a manager who
wanted to bend the rules could find a compliant lawyer somewhere in the
corporate bureaucracy. Heineman's stature was such that if he felt he had cause
to withdraw as the company's counsel, or risked being fired, I suspect that his
separation was more likely to hurt the company than to hurt him. 147
Also, Heineman's book is less than fully candid about some of the legal and
ethical problems that beset his own companyl 48-which is too bad, because the
omissions tend to undercut his central message about compliance with law and
ethics. Young and Brandeis, recall, gave primacy to employees' welfare and
voice in management, 149 but Heineman has almost nothing to say about labor
policy, except one brief passage explaining how complicated it is to devise
workable global standards for the treatment of labor in global supply chainsi50
and another about the importance of transitional arrangements for laid-off
144. SeeKim, supra note 101, at 997, 1001-34.
145. See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk,
and the Financial Crisis, 2012 Wis. L. REV 495, 500-02.
146. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 8-10.
147. Cf id. at 88-89.
148. For a well-written muckraking expos6 of these problems, see THOMAS F. O'BOYLE, AT
ANY COsT: JACK WELCH, GENERAL ELECTRIC, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROFIT (1998). If the
book's reporting is correct, GE senior managers dismissed whistleblowers on several
occasions and thus violated Heineman's strictures that company employees should be
free to report problems up the ladder. See id. at 246-58.
149. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
150. See HEINEMAN, supra note 3, at 201-07.
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workers. 151 His company under Jack Welch treated employees pretty well but
was famous for laying off the bottom 10% every year, ultimately eliminating
over 100,000 American jobs, a practice that earned Welch the nickname
"Neutron Jack." 152
Heineman points with pride to GE's environmental record, but the
company was notorious for stalling for years on orders to clean up nearly two
million pounds of polychlorinated biphenyls that its plants had dumped into
the Hudson River.15 3 The dumping was, however, legal at the time and
occurred before Heineman's tenure, and to its credit, the company did
eventually dredge the river to do the cleanup.1 54
In 2009, GE paid $50 million to settle an SEC lawsuit for securities fraud. 155
GE had engaged in exactly the sort of accounting gimmick that eventually
brought down Enron. To book profits early, it had moved debt off its books by
disguising loans as sales of locomotives. 156 To be sure, in a company of GE's
size, $50 million is little more than a rounding error. But it would have been
useful to learn how such accounting gimmickry could have happened under
the eagle eye of the general counsel's office.
Still more disturbing is Heineman's silence on GE's tax-minimization
strategies. GE's tax department is famous for creative tax dodging, to the point
of reducing its U.S. tax liabilities to zero. 157 The strategies are all arguably legal,
but they are not what one would expect from a company that supposedly looks
to the spirit as well as the letter of the law and wants a reputation as a good
corporate citizen. The company is also very active in lobbying for special
provisions and exemptions, 158 which seems like simple rent-seeking, not
collective action for the common good (which might take the form of lowering
tax rates but eliminating loopholes, or abolishing corporate tax while
increasing individual rates).
151. Id. at 211-12.
152. O'BOYLE, supra note 148, at 71; Opinion, 'Neutron Jack'Exits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2001),
https://nyti.ms/2q3tnDY.
153. See JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS: Two ACTIVISTS FIGHT
To RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT 58-63 (1997).
154. See Jesse McKinley, G.E. Spent Years Cleaning Up the Hudson. Was It Enough?, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8,2016), https://nyti.ms/2pjupOc.
155. See Floyd Norris, Inside G.E., a Little Bit of Enron, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009),
https://nyti.ms/2nPbjye.
156. See id.
157. For an explanation of GE's tax strategies, see, for example, David Kocieniewski, G.E.'s
Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011),
https://nyti.ms/2jWSzZg. See also General Electric: Where Taxes Are a Source of Profits,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/25/
business/general-electric-where-taxes-are-a-source-of-profits.html.
158. Kocieniewski, supra note 157.
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As its general counsel, Heineman was the keeper of his company's secrets
and bound by law as well as loyalty and prudence not to reveal its dirty linen in
public. Still, The Inside Counsel Revolution would have been a much more
informative book if he had been able and willing to describe the pressures
brought to bear on the lawyers in his office and the battles he lost as well as
those he won. What every reader surely wants to know is: How can a general
counsel who wants to be a lawyer-statesman pursuing a capacious concept of
corporate citizenship operate successfully in a company as fanatically dedicated
to meeting profit targets and elevating its stock price as GE was under Welch?
Conclusion
Despite these reservations, I do not think this enterprise can be readily
dismissed as just the glossy-brochure expression of airy ethical aspiration from
those who do not have to put it into practice-judges, law professors, and
retired lawyers. Heineman's is a report from the field, and even if there is much
that it omits or overlooks, it is full of concrete examples of public-minded
activism and pragmatic proposals for institutionalizing the locus of such action
in the general counsel's office. After several waves of corporate scandals that
company lawyers clearly did nothing to stop, and often cheerfully abetted,1 59 it
is refreshing to hear a forthright rejection of commonly held views about both
corporate and legal ethics and the articulation of a task for the general counsel's
office of active leadership in improving the legal, social, and physical
environment in which the company does business.
That is why the Harvard Manifesto and the Heineman book that elabo-
rates its thesis are interesting and potentially important. The moment seems
propitious for a revival of the model of professional leadership articulated by
Brandeis and Young; business leaders should take account of the environment
in which the corporation operates and evaluate the effects of its operations on
that environment and their likely consequences for the future health of the
enterprise. Business leaders need especially to evaluate potentially adverse
consequences such as sullen or rebellious workforces, dissatisfied customers,
and residents living downstream from polluters. They need to anticipate
159. To take one example among many, it has been disheartening to find out that, almost a
decade after the Enron scandal, Lehman Brothers executives were still creating special
purpose vehicles to move debt off the books and disguise it as earnings-the exact same
devices that helped bring Enron down-and that Lehman's lawyers (its London
solicitors, in this case) were signing off on these transactions just as Enron's had done.
For more information on Lehman's collapse, see Report of Anton R. Valukas,
Examiner at 732-42, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), https://web.stanford.edu/-jbulow/Lehmandocs/VOLUME
%203.pdf, which describes the so-called "Repo 105" transactions by which Lehman
disguised its earnings.
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political reactions likely to result in regulation and then, instead of blocking or
evading such regulation, try to devise social welfare-maximizing solutions that
result in gains to all interested parties. The Brandeis-Young view was that
inattention to horrid social effects invites social anger and extremely crude
regulation.1 60 It seemed to them that a socially conscious and responsible
leadership working through alliances such as the National Civic Federation
and the CED can come up with superior and more flexible legal and nonlegal
regimes.161 Lawyers, they believed, were central to this process because their
social and political experiences were often much more extensive than the
managers'; they had often served in important government posts as elected or
appointed officials and were familiar with the ways of the nation's capital.
Brandeis and Young were motivated in part by a stern sense of social duty
of a kind one does not see much of in the business and financial worlds today,
where if one wants to indulge such a sense of duty, the only way to do so is
retire and become a philanthropist. They were also moved by the specter of
labor discontent and class conflict, which, if unmediated, might lead to
socialism or fascism. As Brandeis put it, "[t]here will come a revolt of the people
against the capitalists, unless the aspirations of the people are given some
adequate legal expression; and to this end cobperation of the abler lawyers is
essential."1 62
Now that there seems to be no abuse that labor cannot be made to fatalisti-
cally take in stride, that threat seems less urgent. 163 But I doubt whether
income and wealth inequality can grow much wider without provoking severe
distributional dissent, only so much of which can be channeled into ethnic
nationalism. And what happens after the bursting of another financial bubble-
the return of mass unemployment, the continued escalation of healthcare costs
far beyond what any other society has to pay, the exhaustion of energy sources,
and the destruction of the planet?
Lawyers, as Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out, historically staffed the
country's policy elites and its political leadership class, in and out of office, in
private practice and on leave from it.1 64 More and more lawyers have come to
share this leadership with other occupations, which is fine, but they have also
abdicated leadership. At every stage of professional development, lawyers have
160. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part I.
162. Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law, supra note 17, at 323.
163. For a discussion of the declining influence of the labor movement, see, for example,
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR, at ix-
xxiv, 285-89 (rev. & expanded ed. 2013).
164. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 348-58 (Francis Bowen ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., New York, Century Co. 1898) (1835).
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passed on responsibility for thinking about the social effects of their work on
others. Law professors, themselves refugees from practice or those who have
avoided it altogether, have been producing proposals for the reform of legal
doctrines and institutions, which judges and policymakers could act on. But
they have been slow to address the role of practicing lawyers in implement-
ing-or undermining-such reforms, averting their eyes from what their own
graduates will be doing in practice and leaving effective training, both
technical and ethical, to law firms.
Law firm partners have used the ethics of client service and adversary
advocacy to pass all responsibility for the determination of the ultimate ends of
their work onto clients and their in-house counsel. Many in-house counsel, in
turn, have carefully separated their domain of strictly legal matters from
business decisions or have framed their job simply as that of maximizing the
short-term interests of the client entities, as defined by the managers from
whom they take instructions, regardless of likely impacts on the clients' long-
term interests or those of the communities, environments, or places where
they do business, or employees.1 65 Everyone is, or at least pretends to be, just an
agent-managers of shareholders, inside counsel of management, outside
counsel of inside counsel, and associates of partners. The notion that all of these
agents might have some discretion, some leeway, to consider and serve some
interests beyond short-term profitability for their principals and for
themselves seems both impractical and improper-impractical because of
increased competition among business firms in product markets and among
law firms for clients and rainmaking partners.
It is inevitable that business lawyers are largely creatures of their clien-
teles, both because their ethics mandate that they be so 166 and because they tend
to identify to some extent with their clients' outlooks, ideologies, and
priorities.167 Nonetheless, because of their connection with public institutions
and values of the legal system, lawyers may have some influence over the ways
their business clients voluntarily comply. with, resist, defy, or try to nullify tax
and regulatory regimes and how they seek through judicial, legislative, or
agency action to change those regimes. Brandeis and Young in their day, and
Wilkins, Heineman, and Lee in ours, conceived of lawyers as active shapers of
the client's agenda. A reasonable question follows: What latitude do present-
day business organizations-given the "financialization" of business
management and its obsession with meeting quarterly profit goals-have to
pursue such agendas? Even under pressures of competition and financial
165. See sources cited supra notes 98-104.
166. See supra note 69.
167. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 236-43 (1988).
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markets, it seems that managements have considerable leeway in setting
business strategies-like wage rates; health, sick leave, and maternity/paternity
leave benefits; the conditions of labor in supply chains; environmental policies;
and political causes. The Harvard Manifesto and Heineman's book are, for all
their limitations, signs pointing in the right direction.
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